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The natural effect of trade is to bring about peace.
Montesquieu (1748)

Introduction
The founding of what is now the European Union was based on the premise that close economic integration, with the common institutions necessary to administer it, could contribute decisively to stable and peaceful relations between democratically governed countries (Monnet, 1976) . The successive enlargements of the EU extended this principle to an ever-larger number of countries that formerly were mutual enemies or dictatorships. In parallel, the EU has applied the principle of free trade and successively closer economic integration in various forms to a number of countries in the European Neighbourhood (Diagram 1): seven Balkan countries, 1 ten Barcelona Process countries on the southern Mediterranean coast, 2 and six Eastern Partnership (EaP) countries in Eastern Europe and the Southern Caucuses 3 . It was also applied, less successfully, to the more distant African-Pacific-Caribbean (APC) countries. The aim is to raise income levels and increase political stability, thereby helping to reduce the number of conflicts in the EU's vicinity, conflicts which could spill over into the Union itself. Disrupted energy supplies, inflows of refugees and migrants and spill-over of trans-border criminal activities give the EU a strong self-interest to help resolve conflicts in its neighbourhood. Based on its own historical experience, it sees free trade and close economic integration as a means to resolve these conflicts and foster good-neighbourly relations.
Several additional factors are critical for successful conflict resolution.
Keys to conflict resolution in the Neighbourhood Policy
The Neighbourhood consists of very disparate countries, each wanting to be judged on its own, widely differing objectives and merits. Among these countries some may be eligible for EU membership while others clearly are not; a few are relatively rich countries while many are very poor; all are in different stages of transition from plan to market; some are budding democracies and others harsh dictatorships; 4 and, finally, some have excellent relations with neighbours while others are effectively at war with them.
Each of these factors has a bearing on whether closer economic integration can help resolve conflicts.
1 Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Kosovo. Moldovia was included in the Central European Free Trade Area although formally part of the Eastern Partnership . 2 Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Palestinian Authority, Syria and Tunisia plus four coastal states in the Western Balkans that are potential EU candidates along with Turkey. 3 Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine and Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, respectively. 4 While the Arab Spring has felled some of these dictators, it is not possible yet to say that the outcome will be more democratic governance.
Diagram 1. The European Union Member States and the participants in the European Neighbourhood Policy
Source: http://europa.eu/eucalender/event /id/185095-eastern-partnership-summit/mode/standalone Supposedly a coherent and consistent policy, the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) is, in fact, an improvised amalgamation of policy initiatives undertaken at different times to satisfy the interests of different EU Member States. It includes the Barcelona Process initiated during the Spanish Presidency formulation captures the contradictory nature of the ENP: While one size does not fit all, the suits should be uniform in some respects. But how uniform can procedures be when countries have widely different 5 We shall refer to the Barcelona Process when describing events prior to 2008 and occasionally also after the name change.
objectives and preconditions? Effectiveness when dealing with so many countries requires sorting them into a limited number of groups sharing similar objectives, initial conditions and geopolitical situations and designing common procedures and appropriate incentives for each group. If the situation of each country is sui generis then the ENP degenerates into a baker's dozen of bilateral relationships. The ENP needs to reduce the number of differentiated approaches sufficiently to maintain a single and coherent policy framework that is cost effective.
We identify five key factors as important in order for closer economic integration to contribute to conflict resolution in the Neighbourhood: the existence of a trustworthy facilitator of compromise (Section1.1), the size of incentives provided by the EU, e.g. the prospect of accession to the EU or common institutional frameworks (Section 1.2), whether participants in a regional conflict are all in the ENP and not a third party to it (Section 1.3), the potential leverage of foreign trade in the region (Section 1.4), and last but not least, how far the parties to the conflict have progressed in transition to a well-functioning market economy (Section 1.5). This paper groups the ENP countries in these respects in order to identify which conflicts have high or low likelihood of successful resolution through closer economic integration with each other and to suggest how the likelihood of success can be increased.
Active facilitators of compromise
A conflict which has not ended through unconditional surrender by one party may require a facilitator to assist the parties to settle their differences. In cases where conflicts have involved much death and destruction, outside mediators are usually essential. Bitterness can be so widespread and so deep that neither party is willing either to take an initiative or to respond to one. The EU is in a unique position to act as a facilitator of compromise in its neighbourhood. In major cases it may require support from other facilitators as well, but the facilitators must be well coordinated. In the case of the Western Balkans both the US and the EC played key roles while Member States of the EU (e.g., UK, Germany, Ireland, Sweden) and EFTA (Norway, Switzerland) contributed importantly. Neighbouring Hungary, Slovenia and Turkey also participated and their presence helped prevent bilateral tensions between the parties to a conflict from disrupting attempts at reconciliation. Facilitators of compromise help the parties to take the long view necessary to resolve their problems.
Sufficiently strong incentives
The prospect of accession to the EU has been a key factor encouraging some countries to take steps to resolve conflicts with previous enemies. This prospect increases an ENP country's interest in normalizing 6 economic relations with its neighbours. If both parties to a conflict have the possibility to accede to the EU, they have the strongest possible incentive to resolve their differences. An unresolved conflict will effectively prevent accession (e.g. settlement of earlier disputes between Slovenia and Croatia as well as between Hungary and Romania). When the prospect of EU accession is lacking, some other incentive must be found that encourages the parties to solve a regional conflict. A key question is whether the proposed,
but as yet undefined, Neighbourhood Economic Community provides sufficient incentives.
The neighbourhood countries fall into the following groups as concerns their interest in and eligibility for accession to the EU. The more ambitious the free trade agreement, the greater the reward a neighbourhood country will expect to receive from it. A trade agreement with the EU eliminating tariffs on industrial goods may be its own reward, so to speak, while one involving also several neighbourhood countries and eliminating also non-tariff barriers (NTBs) on all goods and many services requires greater incentives to justify the 8 Shallow agreements remove primarily tariff barriers and quotas. Deep agreements remove other non-tariff barriers (NTBs) and provide for some trade-related regulatory convergence. The scope can be limited to industrial goods or be extended to include agricultural products and also services. The free trade agreement, shallow or deep, can be bilateral or plurilateral.
greater costs. Each of these alternatives entails different costs and benefits for different countries. Clearly, the benefits that a neighbourhood country receives from an agreement must be commensurate with its costs.
No third party to conflict
A second key factor in resolving conflicts is whether the conflict is limited to parties that are members of the Neighbourhood or includes a third party (outside the Neighbourhood). When two ENP countries are in conflict with each other, trade-offs within the framework of the ENP can offer incentives to resolve the conflict. If a third country (outside the ENP) is involved, a separate deal will need to be struck with that country, presumably involving additional side-payments by some actor. Russia is not a member of the ENP. 9 It is, however, involved directly or indirectly in several of the conflicts in the European Neighbourhood. 10 In an institutional sense it is a third party. This reduces the ability of the European Neighbourhood partners to resolve these conflicts on their own.
Combining the factors laid out in sections 1.2 and 1.3 indicates the likelihood of successful conflict resolution (other factors influence this likelihood as well). The various combinations of these two factors are illustrated in Table 1 . The likelihood of successful conflict resolution is greatest if all parties to the conflict are members of the region and if they all share an ambition to accede to the EU. The EU can then make resolution of regional conflicts a precondition for trade agreements with the EU itself and insist on regional economic integration as a means to resolve these conflicts. Accession is the reward for conflict resolution. This provides the EU with strong 'soft power' that it can use in the appropriate circumstances.
Thus, conflicts that fall in the North West quadrant in Table 1 are likely to be the easiest to resolve, other things being equal. The ex-Yugoslavia countries, after bitter conflicts, all wanted to accede to the EU. It took the prospect of EU accession to convince them finally to settle their differences, although with difficulty.
Conflicts that fall in the South East quadrant are likely to be the most difficult and costly to resolve, since the parties are not potential candidates for accession and a third party is involved in the conflict. The countries in conflict thus have weak incentives to resolve their differences. For instance, the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh will be difficult to resolve as long as neither Armenia nor Azerbaijan are eligible for accession and Russia is a third party to the conflict. The prospects to solve the Transnistrian conflict in the North East quadrant are somewhat better assuming Moldova and Ukraine are eligible for accession but also here Russia is a key third party to the conflict. Likewise, the conflict between Georgia and Russia concerning Abkhasia and South Ossetia is likely to remain frozen for long. A prospect to accede could help Georgia resolve this conflict.
When it cannot exercise its "soft power", t he EU must resort to more expensive 'hard power' (both carrots and sticks) to resolve regional conflicts. Those in the North East quadrant will require side payments/fines to the third party outside the ENP. Those in the South West quadrant will require side payments/fines to the parties with no prospect of accession. Depending on the conflict, the hard power required can be extremely costly. Note. The horizontal line in the right hand column is dotted since the operational definition of Europe is unclear.
Strong leverage of foreign trade
Whether the potential for regional trade is large or small determines how the leverage that trade agreements can have on conflict resolution. The larger the potential for increased mutual trade, the more normalization of political relations and trade liberalization can increase trade flows and standards of living.
Realizing large potential gains from trade can by itself help overcome a reluctance to resolve conflicts. The actual share of a country's exports or GDP that is conducted with countries in a conflict situation is a very poor indicator of trade leverage. It is the potential for increased barrier-free trade that it is important to know. The World Bank used a gravity model of trade to estimate potential intra-regional trade for the Balkans in 2000 and found trade liberalisation would triple regional trade.
11 Lacking estimates of potential trade for ENP countries, Diagram 3 shows actual intra-regional trade flows in both the Barcelona countries and in the EaP countries. In 2005 intra-regional trade was extremely low. Intraregional trade in the Balkans was not much larger in 2000 but that region was still suffering from the disruptions of the war. The EaP countries and the Barcelona countries appear to believe that regional free 11 Kaminski and de la Roche (2002) .
trade would have little leverage. These countries focus on exports to the EU which account for around half of their total exports. 1.5 Well-functioning market economies
In order for free trade agreements to realise the potential for increased mutual trade, the signatory countries must have well-functioning market economies. This is rarely the case in countries in the European Neighbourhood.
Each EaP country is a former republic of the USSR and thus as yet lacks strong national institutions and well-functioning market economies. Implementing a deep and comprehensive free trade agreement with the EU or with each other requires an EaP country to speed up progress to a well-run market economy.
Many of the countries on the Southern coast of the Mediterranean also have weak market economies, though for other reasons. In both cases, participation in a DCFTA will require a Neighbourhood country to invest significant resources to build institutions and train personnel in select parts of the acquis communautaire. Presumably, the country wants to modernize its economy. However, if doing so imposes a severe economic burden on a very poor country, it may feel constrained to opt instead for shallow
agreements. Competition policy and Governance and enterprise restructuring) while being close to a market economy on two indicators. On average, the EaP countries were somewhat better than Bosnia-Herzegovina.
In sum, the Balkan countries on average lag significantly behind the eight Central and Eastern European countries that became EU members 2004 in three issues that are key for a deep and comprehensive free trade agreement. The EaP countries on average lag even farther behind. These significant differences between the county groups suggest that the EaP countries are the least ready to negotiate a DCFTA, either with the EU or with each other. These differences are, of course, even greater when we consider individual countries rather than group averages. The next section considers how these indicators -prospects for accession, existence of a third party to a regional conflict, the leverage of foreign trade and the functioning of market economy -affect the likelihoods that a neighbourhood country will succeed to negotiate a DCFTA.
Cases with favourable prospects for conflict resolution
Success in regional conflict solving has been greatest in the Balkans. Progress has been slow and incomplete and some countries still have far to go, nevertheless, step by slow step most countries there have made significant progress (Section 2.1). This progress has been due to the following factors:
i. Active mediators and facilitators of compromise ('godfathering' by the EU).
ii. Credible prospect of accession to the EU and absence of third parties to conflict.
iii. Sufficient progress in transition to a well-functioning market economy.
iv. Large potential for and strong leverage of intra-regional trade.
Bosnia-Herzegovina is the exception that proves the rule and some reasons for its failure to make progress are treated in Section 2.2.
Lessons of success: The Balkans
The facilitator of compromise in this case was the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe.
14 Its purpose was to normalize relations between the newly independent States of Yugoslavia after the bloody civil wars of the 1990s. 15 Gylfason and Wijkman (2011a) . 16 Kaminski and de la Rocha (2002) . Trade between the core countries Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia and Serbia had been badly disrupted by wars in the 1990s. As the network of bilateral agreements grew, the Balkan States finally agreed to convert it into a regional free trade agreement, one which furthermore was to be more ambitious. They signed it in December 2006 and, significantly, called it CEFTA 2006). 17 Why had it taken so long to do achieve this? In addition to the low level of actual intra-regional trade following the wars, the Balkan countries initially suspected that regional free trade was a substitute for EU membership. It took long for the EC negotiator to convince them that regional free trade was, in fact, a prerequisite for accession. Croatia, which was already negotiating accession with the EC, found this especially appropriate: CEFTA had been a transit station for Central and Eastern European countries on their way to EU. 18 The EU was not prepared to admit as member a country with unresolved conflicts with its neighbour. Such conflicts could become an external conflict of the EU or an internal conflict if both countries became members. for and negotiations on accession to the EU. Each country progressed from one station to the next on its own merits. Thus, in some cases progress was rapid, in others it was slow, but in almost all cases it was steady ( Table 2 ). The fact that there was a common objective (EU accession) and a structured road map on how to get there proved essential for progress. The accession track allowed the Balkan countries to start with the easy things and finish with the more difficult (in terms of Diagram 2): relatively shallow agreements with select partners, a plurilateral deep agreement with each other, and finally a bilateral SAA with the EU with the prospect of future accession. all, these are 'projects' that take up to ten years to accomplish. Bosnia-Herzegovina, the country with the lowest transition indicators in the Balkans and the most dysfunctional political will, made slower progress than any other Balkan country toward EU membership. The next section shows why.
Lessons of failure: Bosnia and Herzegovina
The conflicts that once caused the violent disintegration of Yugoslavia remained unresolved within the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. These internal dissensions are the main reason for its lack of progress during the more than fifteen years that have passed since the Dayton Accords. 
A frozen conflict
The Dayton Accords were imposed by outsiders on the Serbian aggressors (in both Serbia and Republika Srbska), making Dayton a cease-fire rather than a peace treaty. War-time political leaders remained in power both within Bosnia-Herzegovina and in its immediate neighbours. Ethnic enmities were elevated to national animosities.
The resulting deadlock of Bosnia-Herzegovina's political system crippled its economic recovery and growth after the war. Although pre-war statistics are uncertain, per capita GDP fell sharply during the war 1992-95, and remains below its neighbours' (Diagram 8). Bosnia-Herzegovina is heavily dependent on 21 Gylfason and Wijkman (2011b) . 22 The international community created the OHR and empowered it to veto laws. This reflected its distrust of BiH's ability to govern itself in an initial phase. After 15 years this foreign tutelage has led to dependency and irresponsibility on the part of the country's politicians. 
An imperfect market economy
Given its low scores on the EBRD transition indicators (Diagram 7), it is not surprising that Bosnia-
Herzegovina lags behind other Balkan countries in fulfilling its obligations under the Central European Free
Trade Agreement (CEFTA) and in negotiating a Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) with the EU.
In its 2010 assessment of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Commission document appears to be at a loss for synonyms to describe the lack of progress made by BiH on key SAA issues. Its verdict in October 2011 confirms its previous negative assessments. BiH may require five more years to implement the SAA fully.
Since politicians in Bosnia-Herzegovina lack a shared vision for the country, the different levels of government have resulted in political deadlocks that prevent enactment of necessary legislation. For instance, the SAA calls for setting up a national state aid agency, but politicians cannot agree on at which This has now proved to be the case. The fiscal problems remained unresolved. The duplication of public functions at various levels of government means that its public sector accounts for the third largest share of employment in Europe (after France and Belgium). As a result, the public sector unions are "wageleaders" and set wages at levels that have eroded the competitiveness of the private sector. Perhaps, if the entities cease to believe they have another option and accept the necessity to live together.
Croatia and Serbia in their respective accession process must commit themselves to respect the territorial integrity of Bosnia-Herzegovina and to abstain from interfering in its internal affairs. Deprived of the prospect of outside support, the entities in Bosnia-Herzegovina may finally revise the Constitution to provide for more effective decision-making and remove the ethnic discrimination that is incompatible with European principles. This is necessary but hardly enough to become a candidate country. To remain a viable state, a process of reconciliation between Croats, Serbs and Bosniaks is essential. Only in the last 24 Fox and Wallich (1997) . 25 IMF (2010) . 26 Bosnia-Herzegovina may do well to recall the problems Turkey faces in its negotiations to accede to the EU. The expulsion of 1.5 million Greeks (albeit formally a 'population exchange') and the fate of 1.5 million Armenians during the Ottoman Empire cast long shadows some 90 years later.
year or so have political leaders made statements signalling the possible initiation of such a process. Much more remains to be done.
This reconciliation will require facilitators of compromise to be much more active. The EU and the US must use their considerable soft and hard power to encourage the parties within Bosnia-Herzegovina to resolve their differences. The EU has to convince all parties in the country that membership is only possible subject to specific political conditions given past history and establish an agreed road map and timetable for fulfilment of these conditions. The soft power of the prospect of membership has worked for some countries with internal conflicts between ethnic/linguistic groups, such as the Baltic countries.
Resolving Bosnia-Herzegovina's more serious internal conflicts will require the use of hard power as well.
A major programme of financial assistance for economic reconstruction and restitution of property to returning refugees may facilitate for Bosniaks to come to terms with some of the injustices done them.
Cases with unfavourable prospects for conflict resolution
The Barcelona Process has made little progress to resolve conflicts between parties in the region. This is because (i) the soft power of accession cannot work here and no close substitute for it has been developed, (ii) the large amount of hard power needed to resolve the 'local conflicts' has not been forthcoming, (iii) the amount of intra-regional trade is small and its potential is uncertain, and (iv) most of the countries have poorly functioning market economies incapable of implementing deep and comprehensive free trade agreements. In addition, many of the States have been governed by nepotistic, corrupt and dictatorial regimes for decades. The fundamental problems are political.
The Arab Spring provides a rare window of opportunity for the Barcelona Process to support implementation of far-reaching reforms in some of these countries. This will require a much more assertive and innovative EU policy in the future than in the past, The EU will have to utilize much more hard power -both carrots and sticks --to encourage the parties to the conflict to make the necessary hard decisions.
Assistance must be made conditional on positive responses by the parties. See Section 3.1.
The Eastern Partnership has only just started and an assessment of its successes is premature.
However, it is safe to say that it did not get off to a flying start. The prospects for successful conflict resolution between the EaP countries appear dim. The primary reasons for this are (i) poorly functioning market economies, (ii) the existence of an aggressive third party to the conflicts, (iii) ambiguity about the eligibility for accession and hence lack of soft power. It is time for the EU to take stock of these difficulties and for the EaP states to review the strength of their commitment to a DCFTA with the EU and with each other. In this case, the fundamental problems impeding progress appear to be economic. See Section 3.2. The economic sense of encapsulating all economic relations of the Agadir Plus countries in a tailormade Neighbourhood Economic Community is strong. However, by itself an institutional superstructure is insufficient to resolve the deep-rooted crises in the Middle East. Significant financial assistance will also be necessary to provide the Palestinian refugees, now numbering about 4.5 million (including their descendants), with decent living conditions and job opportunities. The immediate parties to the conflict are unable and/or unwilling to bear those costs themselves. Outside donors will need to contribute financially to create the political preconditions for a settlement. Economic integration is necessary but not sufficient by itself to resolve this conflict.
The Eastern Partnership countries: addressing economic obstacles to success
It is too early to evaluate how successful the start of the Eastern Partnership has been. Compared with the first partners' high expectations, progress has been disappointingly slow. The countries that first responded positively to the offer to negotiate a DCFTA soon discovered that these negotiations were more complex and took longer than they had expected. Just getting started took time.
In the wave of enthusiasm that followed the orange revolution in Ukraine, the EU started negotiations (ii) Low levels of intra-regional trade in the EaP.
(iii) Mixed economic and political objectives of some participants.
(iv) Starting with the most difficult tasks rather than with the easiest.
Poorly functioning market economies
To negotiate and implement a DCFTA is difficult for EaP countries since most have made only modest transition to a market economy since independence. Administrations in some former republics of the USSR still lack functioning national institutions and retain residual reflexes of central planning. To manage a DCFTA they must build the institutions necessary to administer a market economy and train staff in relevant parts of the acquis communautaire. This takes time and ensures that the process will be a long one.
Limited regional trade leverage?
Intra-regional trade in 2009 (Diagram 12) is small for the EaP six (around five per cent of exports) and even less important than intra-regional trade was in the Balkans (about ten per cent five years after the disruptions of the Yugoslav civil wars). Can regional trade be expected to supply leverage? The EaP six already have regional free trade agreements with each other, albeit very shallow ones, through participation in Community of Independent States (CIS). It is, therefore, unlikely that the priority of any pair of the EaP six will be to conclude a bilateral DCFTA. and looking in vain for the side-payments that could divert the threat from a third part outside the EaP, the slow and hesitant start resulted in disappointment and frustration in the partner countries.
Starting with the most difficult
Both the Balkan countries and the Barcelona Process started with the easier negotiations and proceeded to the more difficult ones while the EaP were required to start with the most difficult -DCFTAs with the EU. This explains the apparent success of the BP countries and the initial difficulties of the EaP countries.
The trajectories of the EaP countries, the Balkan countries and the Barcelona countries are illustrated schematically in Diagram 13.
The BP partners could choose to enter free trade agreements with each other and with the EU that were shallow -and most were. A target date (2010) 
Implications for the Partner countries
The disappointments that have characterized the EaP to date are well described, at least as concerns Georgia, in Messerlin et al. (2011 This was not the case for the BP partners since they did not face the requirement to negotiate DCFTAs. However, the new approach outlined by the High Representative and the Commission in May 2011 in response to the Arab Spring will change this by encouraging also the partners in the Barcelona Process to have similarly high ambitions (COM(2011)201) . It is therefore important they avoid the initial mistakes made in the EaP.
Understanding what is negotiable and what is not
The Commission has essentially defined the elements that a DCFTA is to contain. It includes inter alia technical regulations, sanitary and phytosanitary standards, intellectual property rights, competition policy, state aid and liberalisation of certain services and capital movements. Since the EU is proposing to negotiate DCFTAs with a large number of countries, avoidance of trade diversion and extra administrative costs for both government and business means that there is very little scope to tailor the DCFTA to the wishes of each particular partner. Thus, the scope of the DCFTA is essentially a given. If it does not suit a partner country, it can always opt for a shallow free trade agreement. This means that more BP partners are likely to aim for a DCFTA.
However, while the goal is not negotiable, the way to reach it is. Both the sequence in which the various elements are adopted, the time period over which they are introduced (transition periods), the degree of symmetry in the 'concessions' exchanged and the technical and financial assistance provided to the partner country can vary and will be the subject of negotiations (Wijkman, 2011) . Thus, attempting to negotiate permanent exceptions from the elements of the acquis defining the DCFTA is likely to erode negotiating credibility which can be better used to negotiating sequencing, transition periods, asymmetric concessions and financial and technical assistance.
Role of credibility and mutual trust in the negotiating process
The pre-negotiations and the negotiations for a DCFTA require a partner country to make a credible commitment to approximate the relevant acquis, present a credible time-table for such approximation and a credible plan to implement the acquis by an agreed-upon date. If a partner country is in a position to deliver a credible commitment it need not always 'deliver' substance before the negotiations start. The partner must establish a track record as a negotiating partner who delivers as promised. If it does this, negotiations on a DCFTA can start on a credible promise of delivery. Otherwise, the start will have to await delivery itself. Since the pre-negotiations and negotiations on a DCFTA can well take five to seven years, the partner country has time to approximate necessary legislation, train personnel and build institutions.
In addition, in areas where transition periods after the entry into force of the DCFTA have been negotiated, additional time to adapt is available.
If a partner fails to establish sufficient negotiating credibility, it will often have to pay up-front which may considerably prolong the negotiations. The Partner country may see this as the European Commission adding preconditions, when it is simply the result of low negotiating credibility.
Creating realistic expectations
A DCFTA requires the partner country to legislate and implement significant parts of the acquis. It is necessary to have a realistic view of the magnitude of this task and how long it will take.
It takes time to build institutions and train staff to manage market economies. Some countries have unrealistic expectations of the time required to be in a position to implement a DCFTA. This will lead to misunderstandings and disappointments. A realistic view of what is involved and how long it will take allows the partner to sequence events effectively, to negotiate appropriate transition periods if necessary, and to schedule technical and financial assistance accordingly. It is necessary to understand the magnitude of the task involved in negotiating a DCFTA. It can take up to ten years from initiating the first talks to the entry into force of the Agreement. Given that a DCFTA is a powerful instrument for modernising these economies, a partner must have a long-term time plan for taking each of the many required steps.
Implications for the European Union
Experiences to date suggest that the Commission lacked sufficient resources to negotiate in a timely manner with its EaP partners. The Commission will as of June 2012 negotiate DCFTAs with three EaP countries. In addition, the Commission will conduct a more ambitious policy vis-à-vis the BP partners following the review by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the European Commission of the European Neighbourhood Policy. 33 The stated policy to negotiate Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements with "willing and able partners" in the Mediterranean basin .
This will require the Commission to devote significantly greater resources to the ENP. In general, the EU has raised its expectations on the BP partners, increased the incentives it provides them ("more for more") and demanded greater efforts by the institutions of the ENP. In this intensified work the following elements deserve special attention.
33 A New Response to a Changing Neighbourhood, Brussels25/05/2011, COM(2011) 303. The proposed changes involve inter alia setting up a Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity in the Southern Mediterranean, diversifying programmes to address countries' specific needs, expanding support from government to civil society organizations through a new Civil Society Facility, providing also the Mediterranean countries with a Comprehensive Institution Building Programme, and to increase assistance in the ENP programme by €1242 million up to 2013.
Inform the Partner countries what a DCFTA entails
All countries require better information at various levels about what negotiating a DCFTA involves in order to avoid the deceptions initially experienced by the Ukraine and Georgia . This could be done in the multilateral components of the BP and the EaP respectively. However, the widely different levels of knowledge that these countries have, make it necessary to follow this up in a bilateral context.
Moldova is perhaps the best informed and prepared partner currently as a result of its negotiation of and participation in CEFTA 2006. Through CEFTA, government staff in Moldova has a better understanding of the nitty-gritty of trade policy involved in a DCFTA than in many other partners. This is borne out by the fact that Moldova is the ENP partner that has made the most rapid progress to date.
Give trade policy a lead role in the European Neighbourhood Policy
As the European Neighbourhood now offers to negotiate a DCFTA with more countries in the ENP following the Arab Spring, DG Trade will need more staff and larger resources. Already in the pre- Thus, it increasingly risks having its position on various topics 'revised' in practice as it reports to the TPC and to the European Parliament.
The partner countries need to understand that this is an inevitable part of the negotiating process given the institutional set-up of the EU. Complaining about it will not help. When all of these factors are at work, it is not surprising that a partner may feel frustrated. The EC and interested Member States need to address this problem by increasing the partners' awareness of the nature of the negotiating process.
It is possible that some of the strain on the Commission's resources could eased by making greater use of secretariat's for the EaP and the BP respectively. The idea of a secretariat for the EaP was considered but rejected. This rejection may have been due to experience of the secretariat set up by the Union for the Mediterranean. Two factors made this set-up less appropriate for the task at hand. It had two co-chairman (one from the EU and one from the southern coastal states) to symbolise joint ownership. It was manned by experts seconded by member governments. Neither of these factors is conducive to achieving rapid results. A rotating presidency also provides joint ownership and tends provide more dynamic leadership over time. A secretariat manned by professional experts owing allegiance to the organisation rather than to an individual government is a stronger force for changes agreed upon in common. This is not a structure conducive to effective action and should be reconsidered.
Increase financial and technical assistance
Many ENP States, like the EaP States, have a legitimate point in that they cannot now afford the expense of approximating and implementing parts of the acquis. Adopting a DCFTA certainly provides a welcome crash course in managing a market economy but one that most of these countries can ill afford. To postpone this 'course' until it is affordable would be penny-wise but dollar-foolish. An early start is necessary given that institution-building and personnel training are investments that take a long time to generate results. Thus, additional financial resources are sorely needed. The Commission needs to prepare such activities and mobilise funding within the framework of the ENP, and in particular to activate the Comprehensive Institution Building Programme. It has proposed additional funds for the ENP. But more will be necessary. The EU must mobilise and coordinate activities with interested Member State's own bilateral assistance programmes to this end and with financial institutions. Friends of the particular partner countries are prepared to provide such, long-term bilateral assistance. The EC and interested
Member States need to coordinate their respective efforts during a rather long period until the ENP countries can assume a larger share of these costs.
Provide greater rewards for closer integration
The ultimate soft power exercised by the EU in the Neighbourhood, is the prospect of accession to the EU.
The Western Balkans is a case in point. These countries did not respond actively to the offers to negotiate free trade agreements with each other and with the EU until the EU made the prospect of accession to the European Union credible. However, this soft power is currently not used in the ENP.
The original ambiguity of the ENP ("anything but membership") does not give the ENP partners a membership prospect, rather the contrary. The EC's offer of DCFTAs requires extremely poor countries to adopt large parts of the European Union's acquis without the prospect of eventual accession to the EU. Incentives of a different kind are necessary for those partners for whom accession is not possible.
What can the EU offer these countries to ensure that the payoff in the form of a DCFTA with the EU (without the prospect of possible accession)and other countries in the region justifies the significant costs?
The EU has proposed a Neighbourhood Economic Community (NEC) similar to the European Economic Area (EEA) tht joins the EU and the EFTA countries in the internal market. Before the ENP countries negotiate DCFTAs with the EU and especially with each other they will wish to know what exactly the NEC is. The EU will have to provide an answer. One answer is that it is the institutional framework to administer the 34 Article 49 states inter alia "Any European State which respects the values referred to in Article 2 and is committed to promoting them may apply to become a member of the Union."(italics here). 35 See Hochreiter (2009, 2011). increasingly closer integration of the EU with the coastal Mediterranean states and of the latter with each other. If so, the NEC will be an important contribution to conflict resolution in the EU's neighbourhood.
Conclusion
In this paper we have asked under what conditions the ENP is effective in resolving conflicts in the EU's neighbourhood, one of the main objectives of the EU. In the spirit of Montesquieu and Monnet, the basic hypothesis is that closer economic integration encourages governments to take steps to resolve conflicts and vice versa, creating a virtuous circle. The EU has a strong motive in this because conflicts in its neighbourhood spill over into the EU. We have identified some factors important for success.
1. The existence of active facilitators of compromise, able and willing to exercise both soft and hard power and with a stake in the outcome is essential. We note that these factors were all present in the Western Balkans, a potential black hole inside the EU. While this success cannot be copied, it can be studied. It is clear that in addition major external support must be forthcoming to resolve the conflict in the Middle East. It is also clear that conflicts in the South Caucasus are more difficult to resolve since they involve a third party.
2. The importance of potential intra-regional trade for the countries in the region determines how much leverage deep and comprehensive free trade within the region and with the EU can have on improving economic prosperity and political stability in the countries of the Neighbourhood. We note that this leverage appears greatest in the Western Balkans, is modest in EaP countries and extremely limited in most -but not all -States of the Union for the Mediterranean. Estimates of potential regional trade are necessary before any conclusions can be drawn. However, we believe it likely that an Agadir Plus (the Agadir four plus Israel and occupied territories and Lebanon) has a promising economic potential. This can be an important factor supporting other steps to settle this conflict.
3. Soft power is more effective and cheaper than hard power in persuading parties to resolve a conflict. The ultimate soft power exercised by the EU is the prospect of accession to the EU. The
Western Balkans is a positive case in point. This suggests that the EU should state explicitly which EaP countries are eligible for accession under Article 49, provided they meet the established conditionality. The EU should then make an accession track available for these partners, similar to what it provided for the Western Balkans. This option would make a decisive difference for most, if not all, EaP States.
4. When all parties to a conflict are members of the region, it is easier for the concerned parties and the EU to strike a package deal. This was the case in the Western Balkans and is the case in the Union for the Mediterranean (in particular the conflict concerning Western Sahara). However, if a third party (outside the region) is involved in the conflict, as is the case in the EaP where Russia is involved in one way or another in several regional conflicts, different actors will need to be involved and different procedures tried.
5. The EU will have to resort to the exercise of hard power, thankless and costly, in at least some of the cases under consideration. For instance, the significant amounts likely to be involved to make progress in finally resolving the Israel-Palestine conflict exceed the capacity of the EU alone and will require the participation of the US and others. This will require the EU and the US to have a common policy on this issue and the EU 's Member States as well.
6. Regardless of the ultimate final relationship of the countries of the Neighbourhood with the EU, a deep and comprehensive free trade agreement (regional and with the EU) must provide each country in the neighbourhood with benefits, which it considers commensurate with the costs. This is especially important given the low per capita income of these countries and the high costs of and their limited experience of approximating legislation and institutions on the acquis communautaire.
This will require the EU and its Member States to provide technical and financial assistance to the neighbourhood countries on a scale exceeding current budget allowances and also to allow transition periods in applying the acquis of considerable longer duration than currently foreseen.
7. The EU and the countries in its Neighbourhood today face a truly historic opportunity. After about a century as part of the USSR, the EaP countries are now independent states aiming to establish market economies. The wave of popular demonstrations in North Africa and the Middle East will hopefully soon result in democratic governments there. The population of the Arab countries is now greater than the population of the communist countries of East and Central Europe was in 1989. A a new world of opportunities is opening. A key part of this new world will be effectuating the difficult transition to market economies. A DCFTA is an effective instrument to modernize these countries' economies and to accelerate a country's transition to a functioning market economy. Sooner or later they must undertake this transition. It is better that it take place sooner rather than later. The role of the ENP must be to encourage and assist those willing to do this.
